Antioch Law Journal
Volume 3

Issue 1

Article 12

3-31-1985

Recent Publication: Indian Land Rights
Robert T. Coulter
Steven M. Tullberg

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.udc.edu/antiochlawjournal
Part of the Indigenous, Indian, and Aboriginal Law Commons, and the Property Law and Real Estate
Commons

Recommended Citation
Coulter, Robert T. and Tullberg, Steven M. (1985) "Recent Publication: Indian Land Rights," Antioch Law
Journal: Vol. 3 : Iss. 1 , Article 12.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.udc.edu/antiochlawjournal/vol3/iss1/12

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Digital Commons @ UDC Law. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Antioch Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ UDC Law. For more
information, please contact lawlibraryhelp@udc.edu.

DATE DOWNLOADED: Tue Dec 14 13:49:56 2021
SOURCE: Content Downloaded from HeinOnline
Citations:
Bluebook 21st ed.
Robert T. Coulter & Steven M. Tullberg, Indian Land Rights, 3 ANTIOCH L.J. 153
(1985).
ALWD 7th ed.
Robert T. Coulter & Steven M. Tullberg, Indian Land Rights, 3 Antioch L.J. 153
(1985).
APA 7th ed.
Coulter, R. T., & Tullberg, S. M. (1985). Indian Land Rights. Antioch Law Journal, 3,
153-184.
Chicago 17th ed.
Robert T. Coulter; Steven M. Tullberg, "Indian Land Rights," Antioch Law Journal 3
(1985): 153-184
McGill Guide 9th ed.
Robert T. Coulter & Steven M. Tullberg, "Indian Land Rights" (1985) 3 Antioch LJ 153.
AGLC 4th ed.
Robert T. Coulter and Steven M. Tullberg, 'Indian Land Rights' (1985) 3 Antioch Law
Journal 153.
MLA 8th ed.
Coulter, Robert T., and Steven M. Tullberg. "Indian Land Rights." Antioch Law
Journal, 3, 1985, p. 153-184. HeinOnline.
OSCOLA 4th ed.
Robert T. Coulter & Steven M. Tullberg, 'Indian Land Rights' (1985) 3 Antioch LJ 153
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance of HeinOnline's Terms and
Conditions of the license agreement available at
https://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope of your license, please use:
Copyright Information

INDIAN LAND RIGHTS
ROBERT

T.

COULTER*

and

STEVEN

M.

TULLBERG**

INTRODUCTION

Land rights have been the central issue in United States-Indian relations over the past hundred years, just as they were during the preceding
century. The interplay of two elementary forces has largely determined
the nature of relations between Indian nations and the United States. On
one hand, Indian nations have fought tenaciously to maintain their land
rights. Indian nations, communities and "tribes" have viewed and continue to view land as essential to their economic and cultural well-being,
and thus to their continued political existence. Thus, control over their
land is central to their survival as nations. On the other hand, the United
States has found itself politically constrained to defend its acquisition of
the national territory and, in some instances, to acquire still more Indian
land. Virtually all of the United States territory has been acquired from
Indian nations, either by purchase and agreement or by theft and other
wrongdoing.
United States policy toward Indian lands has been directed by conflicting motivations and by countervailing principles that find their roots
in the desire for resources on one hand, and the more high-minded desire
for justice and the rule of the law on the other hand. The United States
has purported to regulate Indian land transactions by law. Yet the political and economic desires of the nation have dictated that the acquisition
and the retention of Indian land by the federal government must, in fact,
remain unfettered in the national interest. This latter principle found
exact expression in the decisions of Chief Justice John Marshall. Hence,
the judiciary will not interfere with even the most lawless actions of the
Congress and the Executive in dealing with Indian land.
* Executive Director, Indian Law Resource Center, Washington, D.C. B.A. 1966, Williams
College; J.D. 1969 Columbia University School of Law; Editor-in-Chief, COLUMBIA SURVEY OF
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW.

** Staff attorney, Indian Law Resource Center, Washington, D.C. B.S. 1965 University of Wisconsin; J.D. 1970 Columbia University School of Law.
This article, in substance, has previously appeared in S.L. Cadwalader and V. Deloria, Jr. Eds.,
The Aggessions of Civilization (1984), published to commemorate the 100th anniversary of the Indian
Rights Association. The material in the article is derived, in part, from the work of the Indian Law
Resource Center in representing a number of Indian nations in human rights matters in the United
Nations Commission on Human Rights. Other portions of the article are derived from a study
submitted by the Indian Law Resource Center to the International Non-Government Organizations
Conference on Indigenous Peoples and the Land, Palais des Nations, Geneva, Switzerland, (1981),
published by the National Lawyers Guild Committee on Native American Struggles, in Rethinking
Indian Law (1983).
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As a practical matter, political forces have prevailed, and the United
States legal system has provided virtually no protection for Indian land
against takings and control by the federal government. This has meant
not only the deprivation of land and resource rights, but the loss or compromise of other essential Indian rights and interests as well. Federal
power over Indian lands, almost entirely unrestricted by law, has given
the federal government effective power to control almost every aspect of
Indian political and economic life.
Because of the immense economic, cultural and religious significance of land in Indian life, the power to deny or destroy Indian land
rights carries with it the power to destroy Indian identity and culture.
For this reason, disputes over Indian land are by no means merely disputes over property or disputes over economic rights. Rather, they are
disputes about the survival of Indian peoples as distinct peoples nations
or "tribes". In the words of a British Solicitor-at-Law who serves as
legal advisor to Survival International, "the recognition and protection of
land rights remain, for obvious reasons, the focal point of aboriginal
movements almost everywhere." Bennett, infra at 182.*
Conflicts over Indian lands have not lessened over the past one hundred years. This is not unexpected, in light of the fierce resistance of selfgoverning Indian nations and communities to assimilation, and the undiminished economic importance of land. These conflicts have often, especially in recent years, taken place in the context of the legal system,
because the duality and the conflicting principles of United States law
and policy have remained unresolved-appearing to grant legal protection for Indian land and yet, by force of other rules and doctrines, denying that protection altogether.
United States law remains confusing and even mysterious on this
account, and probably cannot be expected to resolve Indian land rights
questions until and unless much-needed reform is brought to the field of
Indian law. Questions of Indian land rights have remained as unsettled
as they were one hundred years ago. United States law regarding Indian
lands has never provided a satisfactory or just resolution, because it is
made up of the most contradictory principles.
Forming one side of the contradiction is the fact that Indian land
rights have always been surrounded with at least the appearance of strict
legal protection. The British crown controlled all dealings with Indian
land, and formal treaties were, from the beginning, the accepted mode of
* All citations in this article refer the reader to the list of references at the end of the article.
The list is arranged alphabetically at pages 182-184. After a case or other source is fully cited in the
text, all other citations to that source will refer to the source itself rather than to the references at
pages 182-184, unless otherwise noted.
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securing and transferring property between Indian nations and the
Crown. The same practice was immediately adopted by the United
States, and further legal protections were established. The Northwest
Ordinance, for example, commanded:
The utmost good faith shall always be observed towards the
Indians; their land and property shall never be taken from them
without their consent; and in their property, rights and liberty,
they never shall be invaded or disturbed, unless in just and lawful
wars authorized by Congress; but laws founded in justice and humanity shall from time to time be made, for preventing wrongs
being done to them, and for preserving peace and friendship with
them. Art. 3, Act of Aug. 7, 1789 infra at 183.
The Due Process Clause of the Constitution, on its face, protected
all property, without limitation, from takings by the federal government
unless "due process of law" were observed and the takings were for a
public purpose. The Constitution likewise made treaties, including Indian treaties, the "Supreme Law of the Land," along with statutes and
the Constitution itself. Later, the Constitution was amended to specifically forbid discrimination based upon race. In the meantime, the
Supreme Court had declared Indian land rights to be as "sacred as the
fee simple of the whites." Mitchel v. United States infra at 184.
Despite this array of legal principles, the United States law and the
courts have not in fact provided substantial protection for Indian lands
against arbitrary confiscations, partitioning, bureaucratic control, and
treaty violations by the United States. For reasons which will be set out
in more detail, the law has failed to give meaningful protection to Indian
lands in the same way that it protects all other property. This fact has,
perhaps more than anything else, affected the lives and fortunes of Indian
peoples, Indian nations and "tribes" during this past hundred years and
indeed throughout the history of the United States.
A brief list of some of the federal "legal" powers which effectively
deny Indian land rights today helps to explain the Indian people's continuing sense of injustice and to highlight the need for further examination
and reform of the United States Indian law.
1. Indian land does not have constitutional protection from arbitrary seizure by the United States. Indian land is the only real property
without that protection. The only constitutional restraint against United
States seizure of Indian land is the requirement that compensation sometimes be paid, but even that legal requirement applies only to so-called
"recognized title" lands which Congress has expressly approved for permanent Indian occupancy.
2. The law provides no protection against federal confiscation of so-
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called "aboriginal title" or "Indian title" lands. Aboriginal title lands are
those which have been Indian lands from time immemorial, but which
have not been expressly "recognized" by Congress for permanent Indian
occupancy. It is not clear what percentage of Indian-held land falls
within the "aboriginal title" category today, but some believe it may be
more than 50 percent. Indians living on these Indian homelands are
treated in United States law as mere tenants at will of the federal government. Indians asserting legal claims in litigation or negotiations for return of such lands are warned by United States officials and members of
Congress that the Indian title to their homelands may be simply "extinguished" on whatever terms the Congress might dictate.
3. It is settled United States law that the Congress may unilaterally
abrogate Indian treaties, the very foundation of United States legal protection for many Indian territories. When Congress passes legislation
doing away with or modifying those treaties, the Supreme Court considers such acts "political questions" which are beyond judicial review. It is
thus politics alone, and not law, which determines whether Indian treaties will continue to be part of the supreme law of the land as the Constitution commands.
4. The United States government today asserts that it, and not Indians, has the ultimate fee or "trust title" to all Indian lands outside the
original 13 colonies. Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, infra at
184. Indians are said to have only a limited right of occupancy. An
"Indian trust relationship" is said to give the United States government
broad legal powers to control and manage Indian land and resources. Id.
at 667. Yet the Supreme Court has just recently made clear that there
are no commensurate federal legal duties towards those Indian lands and
resources. The federal government as "trustee" is liable for mismanagement and wrongdoing only if the federal government expressly imposes
such legal liability on itself by legislation. United States v. Mitchell, infra
at 184. Legal accountability for violations of this "trust relationship" is
otherwise non-existent.
5. When a group of bills to abrogate a broad range of Indian rights
were introduced in Congress in the late 1970's, it was made evident that
political and moral suasion, not law or the judiciary, was the only barrier
against a new effort to terminate Indian governments and tribes altogether. In 1982, Indians had to lobby against a bill intended to extinguish Indian land rights and legal claims to land in eastern states. That
bill, "The Ancient Indian Land Claims Settlement Act," was another
example of the fact that long fought Indian legal victories may be "legally" swept away by congressional act.
This astonishing lack of legal restraints against the federal govern-
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ment is of no small consequence, because the federal government has a
strong and pervasive interest in acquiring or controlling land, water and
other resources. The federal government is, after all, the largest proprietor of land and resources in the country, and it has the most extensive
adverse interest to most Indian land rights and land claims.
As though to excuse or counterbalance the want of legal protections
for Indian property rights, federal officials and many others as well have
urged reliance on the so-called federal-Indian "trust relationship" to protect against abuse of Indian rights. This trusteeship and an enlightened
political and social awareness in Washington are believed to restrict the
federal government from exercising the devastating powers over Indians
which are in that government's hands.
Advocates of the trust theory have forgotten or blocked from view
the fact that it was the federal government which perpetrated the destructive policies of Indian Removal, Manifest Destiny, Allotment, Termination and other wholesale denials of Indian rights. Through these
policies and a host of other federal acts, the federal government has confiscated massive areas of Indian lands for its own use and for its nonIndian citizenry. One looks in vain through the historical record for any
action by the Supreme Court to restrain the federal government and protect Indians from these confiscatory actions.
All of these disastrous federal policies were, as might be expected,
said to be in the "best interest" of the Indian "wards" of the federal
government. But the exercise of non-Indian control over Indian lands is
no less damaging because it is done in the rubric of paternalism rather
than in the name of greed. The cautionary words of Justice Louis Brandeis seem especially apt:
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the government's purposes are beneficient...
The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachments by
men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding. Olmstead
v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928).
The immediacy and the extent of the continuing threat of legally
unregulated federal power was brought home by the Supreme Court's
1978 reaffirmation of the power to terminate or destroy Indian nations
and tribes altogether: "Congress has plenary authority to limit, modify
or eliminate the powers of local self-government which the tribes otherwise possess." Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, infra at 184. This power
was affirmed once again by the Supreme Court in 1982 in Merrion v.
JicarillaApache Tribe, infra at 184.
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THE MARSHALL DECISIONS, CONQUEST AND DISCOVERY
REEXAMINED

All students of United States Indian law would agree on at least one
point: that to understand the origins and development of federal law
pertaining to -Indian land, one must turn to five decisions of the John
Marshall Supreme Court: Fletcher v. Peck, infra at 183; Johnson v. McIntosh, infra at 183; Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, infra at 183; Worcester
v. Georgia, infra at 184; and Mitchel v. United States, infra at 184. Universally used and abused as precedents, the Marshall Court opinions
have been cited in support of opposing doctrines, such as Indian sovereignty and Indian Termination. They were quoted with approval by
British courts upholding England's dominion over the natives of Africa
and India, and yet they have always been the source of ringing pronouncement of the rights of Indian nations under international law.
Although Marshall was a slaveholding Virginia gentleman who consistently ruled that the "property right" in slaves must be upheld in law,
he had a more compassionate view of Indians and was reportedly moved
to tears by arguments made in the Cherokee cases. See Roper, infra at
183. Described by a recent biographer as "one of the largest land speculators of his time," Marshall amassed a fortune in tens of thousands of
acres of land in the Kentucky area of what was then Virginia, a frontier
area which Marshall described as having been "claimed and possessed by
Indians, who maintained their title with as much persevering courage as
was ever manifested by any people." McIntosh at 583. Yet Marshall
refused to uphold the argument that Indians were simply "an inferior
race of people" without legal rights to their homelands. An unquestionably brilliant lawyer and jurist, Marshall drew on the law of the United
States and on international law, the "law of nations" as it was then
known, to set the course of federal Indian law.
The Marshall Court's analysis of Indian land rights centers on an
examination of certain opposing legal theories: on one hand, the theory
that the Indian property right was a right of absolute ownership; and, on
the other, the argument that several legal doctrines operated separately
and in concert to deny Indian land rights. The principal doctrines asserted in opposition to Indian land rights were the doctrine of discovery
and the law of conquest. Although it is today sometimes argued that the
Marshall Court upheld United States title to all Indian lands and found
an extinguishment of Indian land rights by virtue of discovery and conquest, a fair reading of Marshall's opinions supports the very opposite
conclusion.
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The doctrine of discovery came into existence with the rapid expansion of European empires in the 15th Century. Its basic tenet is that the
European nation which first "discovered" and settled lands previously
unknown thereby gained the exclusive European right to acquire those
lands from their occupants. The right of discovery was used, as European nations competed to divide up the world among themselves, to regulate the creation of new empires in a non-European world, and it
became part of the early body of international law.
The property rights of the original inhabitants of the "discovered"
lands-the rights of the hundreds of millions of "natives" or "aborigines" of most of the world outside of Europe-were somewhat uncertain
in the early years of this European invasion. The question of native
property rights was part of the legal, theological and scientific debates
about whether the natives were indeed fully human, whether they were
susceptible to Christian conversion, and whether they were capable of
European-style ("civilized") culture, government, agriculture and
industry.
Although these debates would continue long into the 20th Century,
by the time of European settlements in North America, it was well-established in international law that natives had legally protected rights to
their lands, rights which could not be lawfully denied by the discovering
European nation. That principle became established in the municipal
law that governed the affairs of European nations in North America.
The Indian nations were deemed by law to have the right to own, use and
dispose of their homelands. Vattel, infra at 183; Cohen, infra at 182.
In the early period, no other rule could be imposed because the military power of England and the rest of Europe was clearly inferior to that
of the Indian nations. So, as a matter of legal principle and practicality,
European nations dealt with the Indian nations as they did with other
nations of the world. Indian lands were, in general, acquired by agreement, through the use of traditional international diplomacy, through
formal treaties of cession, and not by military conquest or fiat. The practice of Spain, France and the Netherlands did not differ in this regard.
Thomas, infra at 183.
By right of discovery, the first European nation to discover American lands previously unknown to Europe had, in effect, an exclusive European franchise to negotiate for Indian land within the discovered area.
International law forbade European nations from interfering in the diplomatic affairs which each carried on with the Indian nations within their
respective "discovered" territories.
The right of discovery was a limitation on the powers of European
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nations to interfere in the affairs of other European nations. Oppenheim,
infra at 183. It did not limit the legal powers or rights which Indian
nations had in their homelands. Its major limitation was to prohibit Indians from diplomatic dealings with all but the "discovering" European
nation. In those areas of North America, for example, where England
was held to be the only European nation lawfully authorized to make
treaties of cession with the Indian nations, England was said to be the
only nation possessing the power to extinguish Indian title. The right of
discovery gave England the right to extinguish Indian title only when the
Indians gave their consent to that extinguishment by treaty.
John Marshall, a highly regarded expert in the international law of
his day, was intimately familiar with this law and history. He refused to
accept the twisted argument that discovery had extinguished Indian land
rights. In his first major opinion on the discovery issue, McIntosh infra
at 183, Marshall made clear that the law of nations and the doctrine of
discovery did not operate to deny Indian land rights:
On the discovery of this immense continent, the great nations of
Europe were eager to appropriate to themselves so much of it as
they could respectively acquire. Its vast extent offered an ample
field to the ambition and enterprise of all; and the character and
religion of its inhabitants afforded an apology for considering them
as people over whom the superior genius of Europe might claim an
ascendency. The potentates of the old world found no difficulty in
convincing themselves, that they made ample compensation to the
inhabitants themselves of the new, by bestowing on them civilization and Christianity, in exchange of unlimited independence. But
as they were all in pursuit of nearly the same object, it was necessary, in order to avoid conflicting settlements, and consequent war
with each other, to establish a principle, which all should acknowledge, as the law by which the right of acquisition, which they all
asserted, should be regulated, as between themselves. This principle was, that discovery gave title to the government by whose subjects, or by whose authority, it was made, against all other
European governments, which title might be consummated by
possession. The exclusion of all other Europeans, necessarily gave
to the nation making the discovery and sole right of acquiring the
soil from the natives, and establishing settlements upon it. It was
a right with which no Europeans could interfere. It was a right
which all asserted for themselves, and to the assertion of which, by
others, all assented. Those relations which were to exist between
the discoverer and the natives, were to be regulated by themselves.
The rights thus acquired being exclusive, no other power could
interpose between them. McIntosh, at 572.
In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, infra 183, Marshall openly ridiculed
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the notion that the right of discovery gave European nations absolute
title and dominion over Indian lands, calling it an "extravagant and absurd idea":
Soon after Great Britain determined on planting colonies in
America, the king granted charters to companies of his subjects,
who associated for the purpose of carrying the views of the crown
into effect, and of enriching themselves. The first of these charters
was made before possession was taken of any part of the country.
They purport, generally to convey the soil, from the Atlantic to
the South Sea. This soil was occupied by numerous and warlike
nations, equally willing and able to defend their possessions. The
extravagant and absurd idea, that the feeble settlements made on
the sea-coast, or the companies under whom they were made, acquired legitimate power by them to govern the people, or occupy
the lands from sea to sea, did not enter the mind of any man.
They were well understood to convey the title which, according to
the common law of European sovereigns respecting America, they
might rightfully convey, and no more. This was the exclusive
right of purchasing such lands as the natives were willing to sell.
The crown could not be understood to grant what the crown did
not affect to claim; nor was it so understood. Worcester v. Georgia,
at 554-545.
Later Supreme Court decisions sometimes gave haphazard attention
to the discovery doctrine and cited it as legal authority for United States
ownership and extinguishment of Indian land title. See, e.g., Martin v.
Waddell, infra at 183. But the Marshall Court decisions are still today
the leading precedents on the subject, and they establish that the doctrine
of discovery gave no legal authority to control, manage or confiscate Indian lands and resources. Discovery conferred no greater right than the
exclusive right of purchasing such lands as the natives were willing to
sell.
The Law of Conquest: An Antiquated Legal Doctrine Which Has Never
Been Properly Applied to the Law Governing United States
Relations with Indian Nations and Tribes
It was argued in the Marshall Court Indian cases that the legal title
to Indian lands, or the legal power to extinguish title to Indian lands, had
been acquired by right of conquest. Conquest is no longer an accepted
mode of acquiring territory but it was accepted law until the mid-20th
century. Oppenheim, at 599-605. Just as the Marshall Court rejected
discovery as legal authority for denial of Indian property rights, so too it
rejected the conquest argument.
Upon conquest, the victor of just, lawful war (a war in which the
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victor was not the aggressor) was permitted by the law of nations to subjugate the defeated enemy by disestablishing its government and formally
annexing the conquered territory. This subjugation was deemed to completely extinguish the enemy nation's land title and to vest that title in
the victorious nation which thereafter had sovereignty over the conquered territory. Oppenheim, at 566-567.
The law of nations provided that the conquering nation became the
sovereign of the conquered territory only if it chose to subjugate completely the defeated enemy and formally annex the conquered territory.
If the victor chose instead to make a treaty of peace and to acquire only
some of the defeated nation's lands by forcing the defeated nation to cede
them by treaty, the victor acquired title to only those ceded lands. Having chosen to make a treaty of cession rather than assert a right of conquest through complete subjugation and annexation, the victor did not
acquire any sovereignty over or title to the non-ceded territory of his
defeated enemy. Id.
Both history and legal analysis show that the law of conquest had no
effect whatsoever on Indian property rights which they did not cede to
European nations or the United States. As a matter of historical fact, the
United States has never (with one very minor exception) claimed title to
Indian land by right of conquest. Thomas, at 640. The United States
chose instead to follow the lead of England, France, Spain and the
Netherlands and make treaties of cession, even in those cases where Indian nations had been as a practical matter defeated in war. Even if the
colonizing nations and the United States could have established the
highly questionable proposition that these were just, defensive wars, the
historical fact remains the subjugation, annexation, and the disestablishment of Indian governments were not imposed on defeated Indian nations by the European nations or the United States.
Just as important to the legal analysis of the conquest doctrine is the
fact that the overwhelming majority of Indian treaties of cession were not
the consequence of warfare but the result of peaceful, arms-length negotiation and purchase. Many Indian nations and tribes never fought any
battles with the United States and never made any treaties with the
United States. Moreover, in a number of cases where Indian treaties of
cession were made after warfare, the Indian nations had not in fact suffered military defeat, but had either won the war or had fought to a
stalemate. Such was the case, for example, of the Sioux when they entered into the Treaty of Fort Laramie in 1868.
In his opinion in McIntosh John Marshall expounded at length on
the law of conquest. His discussion of conquest has at times been cited as
authority for the proposition that Indian land rights were indeed lawfully
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acquired by the United States by conquest. But on the contrary, Marshall finally concluded that under the historical circumstances, the law of
conquest "was incapable of application" to Indian nations. McIntosh, at
591. The subsequent Marshall Court Indian decisions made even more
clear that purchase, and not conquest, was the source of United States
titles to those lands which had been acquired from Indian nations. A
Supreme Court decision rendered a few years after the Marshall Court
era also noted in passing that the European possessions in America had
not been claimed by right of conquest. Martin v. Waddell, at 408.
This early Supreme Court rejection of conquest as a source of
sweeping United States power over Indian lands should have been the
end of the legal debate. But a particularly pernicious Supreme Court
decision in Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, infra at 184, rendered
over a century after the Cherokee cases, revived the conquest rationale
and generated new confusion in legal circles about the possible legal significance today of the supposed conquest. Reference to the conquest theory in Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States must be ranked among the
most uninformed and unfounded statements ever made on Indian affairs
by the Supreme Court:
After conquest [Indians] were permitted to occupy portions of territory over which they had previously exercised "sovereignty," as
we use the term. This is not a property right but amounts to a
right of occupancy which the sovereign grants and protects against
intrusion by third parties but which right of occupancy may be
determined and such lands fully disposed of by the sovereign itself
without any legal enforceable obligation to compensate the
Indians.
Every American schoolboy knows that the savage tribes of this
continent were deprived of their ancestral ranges by force and
that, even when the Indians ,'zded millions of acres by treaty in
return for blankets, food ap' trinkets, it was not a sale but the
conquerers' will that deprivec, tI -m of their land. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, at 289-290.
The application of the conquest theory to the Tee-Hit-Ton Indians
who, as Alaskan natives never fought a skirmish with either Russia or
the United States, is particularly absurd. As one legal scholar noted,
"The only sovereign act that can be said to have conquered the Alaska
native was the Tee-Hit-Ton opinion itself." Newton, infra at 183.
The Marshall Court decisions are ample and compelling authority
that the United States has not acquired power over or title to Indian
lands by right of conquest. Had Marshall concluded at that point, Indian lands might have enjoyed relative legal security, but that was not to
be. Marshall went on to acquiece in and condone the usurpation of In-
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dian lands, and in so doing set the course for more than a century of
widespread denial of legal protection of Indian land rights by the federal
courts and other branches of the government.
THE DENIGRATING OF INDIAN TITLE TO A MERE RIGHT OF
OCCUPANCY

Marshall and other early Americans of property were most concerned that Indian property rights not detract from the security and
value of white land titles. After all, as Marshall noted, "our whole country" has been "granted by the crown, while in the occupation of Indians." McIntosh at 579. The English Crown's policy of making such
grants had been continued by the United States. For example, such government grants were made as payment to Revolutionary War soldiers.
For service as military officers in the War, both John Marshall and his
father received United States land grants totalling more than 10,000
acres. Baker, infra at 182. Marshall noted that if Indian title were permitted to cloud the land titles which whites held under these grants, almost every white land title in New England, New York, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Maryland and part of Carolina would be adversely affected. McIntosh, at 579. In addition, the land speculation business in
which Marshall himself was heavily involved would have been severely
damaged. Id.
Marshall determined that the property rights of non-Indians must
be made secure, even if it meant twisting or ignoring settled legal doctrine and adopting what he himself termed an "extravagant pretention":
converting the right of discovery into actual land title, and thus
fabricating a secure and marketable title for non-Indians to lands still
occupied and never in any manner given up by the original Indian owners. Marshall used the term "extravagant pretention" because the result
he sought and achieved was by no means a rule of law nor based upon
legal principles. Rather, it was a result dictated by political expediency,
personal interest, and what Marshall saw as the national interest. He
adopted a theory to correspond to what already occurred: that the discovering European nation could hold or grant to others the "absolute
title" to lands still in the possession of the original Indian owners and
prior to any conveyance or other acquisition of the Indian rights to the
land.
Under this theory of expediency, Indians were regarded not as owners, as then-existing international law commanded, but "merely as occupants", although their "right of occupancy" was to be given full legal
protection until ceded to the United States government. In the last of the
Marshall Court decisions on Indian title, this Indian right of occupancy
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was characterized as "sacred as the fee simple" title held by white land
owners although it was clearly of inferior status in the legal hierarchy of
land titles. Mitchel, at 746; see also Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, infra at
183, (Baldwin, J. concurring).
This new theory permitted the United States to claim and to grant
or sell to others the ultimate or "underlying" fee to Indian-occupied
lands. This fee was said to be subject to the Indian right of occupancy by
which the Indian owners continued to live on the land without the express permission of the white fee holder or the United States. The Indian
right of occupancy could be terminated only by the United States, and
upon such termination or extinguishment of the Indian right, the white
fee title was cleared of the encumbrance of Indian occupancy and was
thereby perfected.
In this political compromise, Marshall, however, preserved one essential Indian right which was also to be ignored in subsequent Supreme
Court decisions. Marshall held that the Indian's right of use and occupancy could be terminated only with the consent of the Indian inhabitants. Later Courts would soon disregard this requirement as well.
In his 1823 decision in Johnson v. McIntosh, Marshall candidly admitted that the new rule was designed outside the settled rules of law, to
accommodate what he considered to be the political realities of the day:
If the property of the great mass of the [white] community
originates in it, it becomes the law of the land, and cannot be questioned.

.

. However this restriction [on the Indians] may be op-

posed to natural right, and to usages of civilized nations, yet, if it
be indispensible to that system under which the country has been
settled, and be adapted to the actual condition of the two people, it
may, perhaps, be supported by reason, and certainly cannot be rejected by courts of justice. McIntosh, at 590.
In deferring to the political reality he saw, Marshall revealed his
qualms about elevating to exclusive, absolute, fee simple status the land
titles of whites, a decision which commensurately denigrated the nature
of Indian title. Although Marshall's decision purported to protect the
Indians' right of occupancy of their homelands, it carried within it the
seeds of destruction for Indian land rights, for it denied the cardinal tenet
of ownership in law. McIntosh, at 574. Indian title was deemed imperfect and imperfectable, and could never acquire the absolute fee status
which was and is the epitome of property rights under United States law.
McIntosh, at 591. His decision served to reinforce the widely held view
that Indian property rights were a mere impediment to the progress of a
higher, white civilization in America.
Marshall's decision was essentially political rather than legal, and
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clearly visible within it was the imperial cant, racial prejudice and then
"scientific" view of inevitable white ascendency over the non-white peoples of the world. Marshall's opinions are replete with references to the
"savages" and their non-productive nomadic use of the land, prejudices
and historical inaccuracies which are long discredited.
In taking this middle road between complete disregard and complete
respect for Indian rights to Indian land, Marshall also signaled for the
first time that certain important Indian affairs decisions of the political
branches of government would be treated by the Supreme Court as political questions which are not subject to being overruled by the judiciary,
that they are matters which "cannot be questioned" and "certainly cannot be rejected by courts of justice." In the development of federal Indian
law, this political question rationale has been used time and again to
deny federal judicial power to check and balance the abuse of Indian
rights by the Congress and the Executive. Coulter, infra at 183. While
the political question doctrine is properly applied in many areas of government action, such as foreign relations, its application to Indian affairs,
while perhaps not improper, has meant a broad denial of judicial protection for Indian rights, particularly land rights.
Having adopted a legal approach which denied Indian land rights
the full legal and constitutional protection which United States law accords to fee title, Marshall opened the way for the wholesale legal erosion
of legal protection for Indian title which followed. Some federal judges
continued to emphasize that Indian title was merely a right of occupancy.
By 1955, the Supreme Court ruled that Indian title could be extinguished at the whim of the United States government, without due process of law and without any compensation. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v.
United States, infra at 184. In the 1960's, Indian title was compared to a
tenancy at will; Indians had rights only as tenants of the United States on
Indian homelands traditionally occupied by Indians. In the Sioux Nation
case of 1980, the Supreme Court gratuitously reaffirmed that "the taking
of the United States of 'unrecognized' or 'aboriginal' Indian title is not
compensable under the Fifth Amendment." Sioux Nation of Indians v.
United States infra at 184.
The end result of this historical development is coldly summarized
by the Deputy Solicitor General of the United States who has been
chiefly responsible for representing the United States government in
Supreme Court cases involving Indian rights:
According to McIntosh, it was always understood that legal title to
tribal land belonged to the United States-which placed the tribes
in a position of vassalage vis-a-vis the national sovereign.
We may well doubt whether those who wrote the Constitution

1985]

INDIAN LAND RIGHTS

ever contemplated federal power unilaterally to dismember reservations, to transfer jurisdiction to the states, and to 'terminate'
tribes altogether. But we must accept that they did.
Claiborn, infra, at 182.
As long as this view of unchecked federal power over Indian lands
prevails in the United States law, the most fundamental rights of Indian
nations and tribes will remain in jeopardy, and Indian land rights and
land claims are likely to remain unresolved.
THE INDIAN TRUST RELATIONSHIP:

RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AND

BOUNDLESS UNITED STATES POWER DISGUISED AS MORAL
AND LEGAL DUTY

Under one theory of United States law, Indian nations and tribes are
said to be the permanent "wards" or "beneficiaries" of a "guardianship"
or "trusteeship" administered by the United States government. Today
this relationship is most commonly referred to as the "Indian trust
relationship."
The Indian trust relationship is a legal concept by which the United
States government claims the authority to exercise exceptional powers
over all Indian property and Indian affairs. The trust theory is built
upon the United States government's assertion that it holds "trust title"
to virtually all Indian lands. The 1981 Handbook of the United States
Bureau of Indian Affairs recites the official government trusteeship claim
in altruistic language which is characteristic of the government's assertion of this trust authority over Indian lands:
By the authority vested in it through numerous treaties, congressional acts, court decisions and executive orders, the U.S. today
holds in trust some 53 million acres for the benefit of and use by
Indian tribes and individuals.
U.S. Department of Interior Report infra at 7.
Relying on this assertion of trust title, the Bureau of Indian Affairs administers and manages almost all Indian land and resources.
Treaties have not, however, made the United States such a "trustee"
of Indian lands. The typical kind of treaty language which some argue
created the Indian trust relationship provides only that Indians "acknowledge themselves in their treaties to be under the protection of the
United States," and only some of the hundreds of different Indian treaties
contain that language. In general, there is virtually nothing in the history of such treaties to suggest that such language was intended to create
any general trusteeship. The United States is a self-appointed "trustee."
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The Indian trust relationship idea is said to have first appeared in
United States law in the Marshall Court's decisions. Chief Justice John
Marshall concluded in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, at 17-18, that the
relation of Indian nations to the United States "resembles that of a ward
to his guardian." In fairness to Marshall, it should be emphasized that
this Indian guardianship concept had little in common with the Indian
trust relationship which developed out of it. The Marshall Court referred only to a consensual guardianship with very limited powers and
duties as provided by treaty and international law.
The Marshall Court made clear in Worcester that the Indian
"guardianship," to which it referred was not like the paternalistic guardianship which applied to infants and mental incompetents, but was rather
an international compact in the nature of an international protectorate
relationship or alliance:
The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independent, political communities, retaining their original natural
rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil, from time immemorial, with the single exception of that imposed by irresistible
power, which excluded them from intercourse with any other European potentate than the first discoverer of the coast of the particular region claimed; and this was a restriction which those
European potentates imposed on themselves, as well as on the Indians. The very term, "nation", so generally applied to them,
means "a people distinct from others." The Constitution, by declaring treaties already made, as well as those to be made, to be the
supreme law of the land, has adopted and sanctioned the previous
treaties with the Indian nations, and consequently, admits their
rank among those powers who are capabale of making treaties.
The words "treaty" and "nation", are words of our own language,
selected in our diplomatic and legislative proceedings, by ourselves, having each a definite and well-understood meaning. We
have applied them to Indians, as we have applied them to the
other nations of the earth; they are applied to all in the same sense.
Worcester v. Georgia, at 559.
Thus, although the Marshall Court characterized Indian nations as
"domestic dependent nations," in a "state of pupilage" Cherokee Nation
v. Georgia, at 17, the Court explained that this characterization did nothing to deny Indian nations their exclusive, sovereign rights to their Indian lands. To the extent that some Indian nations were deemed legally
"dependent" pursuant to specific treaty agreements under an international-type guardianship or protectorate relationship with the United
States, that relationship was held to arise solely out of the operation of
specific treaties and international law. Nothing in the rulings of the Mar-
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shall Court even remotely suggested that a guardian-ward relationship
could be unilaterally imposed on Indians or that the United States held
trust title to Indian lands or could, as trustee, seize and dispose of Indian
lands without Indian consent.
Unfortunately, however, the emphasis Marshall placed on the "dependency" idea, combined with his other disparaging comments about
Indians and their need to be instructed in the ways of civilization, paved
the way for the debilitating and paternalistic Indian trusteeship idea
which soon gained prominence in United States law. Marshall had not,
in fact, accepted the argument made in McIntosh that Indians were simply "an inferior race of people under the perpetual protection and pupilage of the government." McIntosh, at 567. But within the following
decades of the mid-19th Century, the Supreme Court rejected Marshall's
more humanitarian approach and adopted the notion of a permanent
trusteeship over Indians. This shift of views reveals an expectation that
the "semi-barbarous" Indians would simply give place to the "higher civilization" of the white race:
[T]he right which the Indians held was only that of occupancy.
The fee was in the United States, subject to that right, and could
be transferred by them whenever they chose . . . . It is to be
presumed that in this matter the United States would be governed
by such considerations of justice as would control a Christian people in their treatment of an ignorant and dependent race. ...
The power of the United States to make such transfer has in no
instance been denied. . . . Congress undoubtedly expected that at
no distant day the State would be settled by white people, and the
semi-barbarous condition of the Indian tribes would give place to
the higher civilization of our race. ...
Beecher v. Weatherby, infra at 183.
As the military and economic power of the United States rapidly
grew during the middle decades of the 19th Century, the law of the
United States abandoned the Marshall Court's restrictive interpretation
of the Indian guardianship and began to treat Indians as infants and incompetents. Paternalistic power to take unilateral action replaced the
limited legal authority based on treaty agreements and international law.
In arriving at this revised view of Indian guardianship, the Supreme
Court relied on the racial prejudice and chauvinist assumptions which
dominated European and American thinking in that colonial era: the
idea that white, European peoples constitute a superior race whose "civilized" religion and way of life must be emulated and, if possible, assimilated by the other, non-white "lower races" of the world.
During this same period, the colonizing nations of Europe were also
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excusing their practices in Africa, Asia and elsewhere by claiming to be
trustees. European imperial theorists had begun to view the non-white
"natives" of the European empires as beneficiaries of a "trusteeship for
civilization" whose lands, resources and governmental affairs would be
managed for them by Europe under an "imperial tutelage." Curtin, infra
at 183.
The United States increasingly relied on the guardianship or trusteeship rationale as justification for the seizure of Indian lands. The General Allotment Act of 1887, for example, was designed by the United
States Congress to divest Indian nations of their land titles and to divide
up all Indian lands into individually owned homesteads. The United
States decided that by "breaking up the tribal mass" Indians would be
freed from the debilitating restraints of Indian tribal society. Heads of
Indian families were to be assigned private title to allotments of 160 acres
each. For a short period of time these allotments were to be held free
from taxation, "in trust" by the United States government. Thereafter
the property was taxable and subject to seizure and sale for non-payment
of taxes. all unallotted "surplus" Indian land would be sold by the
United States to whites. This taking and disposition of Indian nation
lands was said to be "in the best interest of the Indians." Congress, as
"trustee", intended to end communal ownership of Indian lands and to
instruct Indians in the benefits of "competitive selfishness" which Indians had to learn if they were to advance to a higher level of civilization.
As a result of the allotment policy, Indian nations and tribes lost
two-thirds of their lands to whites during the following forty years.
Although these takings were imposed on Indian nations, the language of
trusteeship was used to justify this massive confiscation of Indian lands,
and the law of the United States officially described them as "cessions in
trust." Fortunately, many Indians were successful in their resistance to
implementation of the General Allotment Act and other allotment statutes. Indians managed to retain effective control over at least a part of
their lands until the allotment policy was formally repudiated by the
United States government in the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934.
But unfortunately, the Indian trust relationship which was used to
deny Indian property rights in the allotment era has not been repudiated,
and has been used again and again to deny Indian rights. The powers
which this trusteeship or wardship gives to United States administrators
was described in a 1953 article by Felix Cohen, the most eminent scholar
of Indian law, who concluded that the wardship idea was simply a
"myth", a legal fiction:
[T]he term [wardship] soon became a magic word in the mouths
and proclamations of Indian agents and Indian Commissioners.
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Over the years, any order or command or sale or lease for which
no justification could be found in any treaty or act of Congress
came to be justified by such officials as an act of "guardianship,"
and every denial of civil, political, or economic rights to Indians
came to be blamed on their alleged "wardship." Under the reign
of these magic words nothing Indian was safe. The Indian's hair
was cut, his dances forbidden, his oil lands, timber lands, and
grazing lands were disposed of, by Indian agents and Indian Commissioners for whom the magic word "wardship" always made up
for any lack of statutory authority. . . . The paternalistic attitude
of Indian Bureau administrators during recent years has unfortunately served to buttress that illusion. But it remains an illusion,
unsupported by legal authority.
Cohen, at 331.
In his classic treatise on United States Indian law, Cohen concluded
that Congress used its "wardship power" as a "justification for federal
legislation which would be considered 'confiscatory' if applied to nonIndians." Cohen at 170.
The Indian trust concept was used in an especially twisted manner
to justify the Indian Termination policy of the 1950's, a policy which
forced the dissolution of a number of Indian nations and tribes, caused
much turmoil and hardship in the terminated Indian communities, and
led to further loss by Indian lands. The United States rationalized its
termination policy by asserting that it had the legal power to unilaterally
terminate its trust relationship with Indian nations and tribes and by so
doing to subject them to the devastating taxation and control of the
states. By the 1950's, the United States had come to view the Indian
trust relationship as a gift to Indians from the United States which served
as the sole foundation of all Indian rights to self-determination and property. That gift could, under United States law, be given or retracted at
the whim of the United States government.
The trust doctrine continues to permeate United States Indian law
today, and the United States continues to rely on the "Indian trust responsibility" for broad, unfettered powers over Indian property and Indian affairs. Because the United States claims to be trustee over Indian
lands, it exercises immense power over the lands and over virtually all
aspects of Indian life on reservations. The United States, through the
Bureau of Indian Affairs, leases Indian lands, controls grazing, regulates
mineral development and virtually all economic activity on Indian land,
controls the inheritance of allotted lands, controls water usage on reservations and regulates virtually every form of activity related to the land.
Some examples help illustrate how these federal trust powers are
asserted today:
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-In 1979, the U.S. Department of the Interior's assistant Secretary
for Indian Affairs threatened, as "trustee," to propose legislation to Congress which would impose a final settlement of all Oneida Nation land
claims.
-In a 1980 Supreme Court case, the United States government opposed a damages claim for the taking of Sioux lands by the United States.
The United States argued that it should not be held liable because in
taking those Sioux lands the United States was acting as trustee, in the
best interest of the Sioux people. The United States' brief argued:
The Court long recognized that the Indian tribes have been incapable of prudent management of their communal property, and
that the United States must undertake this duty as fee owner of
tribal lands and pursuant to its power to deal with Indian affairs.
A disposal of tribal property in the discharge of this responsibility
to manage the property for the tribe's benefit is an act on behalf of
the tribe and, in effect, a disposal by the tribe. A proper exercise
of this power is no more a taking than would be a sale by the tribe
itself, were it freed from historical disabilities.
The same perverse logic remains available to the United States government whenever it might seek to justify theft of Indian lands as an act of
guardianship or trusteeship. Although the Supreme Court did not accept
this argument in the Sioux case, the Supreme Court did go out of its way
to endorse broad Congressional powers to extinguish Indian rights to
lands.
-A 1981 Supreme Court decision involved a dispute over ownership and control of a river running through the Crow Indian reservation.
That reservation, which had always belonged to the Crow, was reserved
for their "absolute and undisturbed use" by treaty with the United
States. The Supreme Court concluded that because the United States
had "trust title" to that river, and because the river was not expressly
reserved to the Crow people in the treaty, the "trust title" of the United
States had been transferred by legal presumption to the State of Montana
when that state was subsequently created. Because the Supreme Court
assumed that the United States had trust title to the Crow river, it has
been formally lost to the Crow Nation. Montana v. United States, infra
at 184.
The vast and legally unlimited federal trusteeship power extends, as
a practical matter, far beyond the use of the land itself, for the power
over land is so great that it embraces and carries with it the power to
control practically every aspect of reservation life. The voice and authority of the trustee's chief agent, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, cannot be
ignored even with regard to matters not directly related to the land. The
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Bureau of Indian Affairs and other federal agencies have enormous
power to affect and control Indian governments in regard to questions of
jurisdiction, domestic relations, relations with state and local governments, commercial activity of all kinds, education of Indian children,
religious ceremonies and practices and practically every other aspect of
reservation life. Said another way, the fact that Indian land rights are
subject to unfettered federal power has made all other Indian rights subject to abuse as well.
In certain cases, Indian governments have expressly consented to
placing land in trust with the United States, and in those instances trusteeship can hardly be doubted. But apart from these exceptions the asserted trusteeship over Indian lands is without support in treaties,
general international law or domestic law.
The Indian trust relationship is seen by some as the only alternative
to the disastrous federal policy of termination. This is an understandable, though legally incorrect position given the gross misuse of the trust
relationship idea during the termination era of the 1950's.
The Indian trust relationship has been seen by others as a source of
general legal responsibilities or duties which the United States could be
legally obligated to fulfill towards Indians. Beginning in the early 1970's,
an intensive effort was made to urge the United States to declare that the
Indian trust relationship could be relied upon by Indians as a legal basis
from which to challenge the United States' management of Indian resources, to advance Indian land claims, to secure federal funding for Indians, and to protect the existence and jurisdiction of Indian
governments. See, e.g., Chambers infra at 182.
These efforts have not proven very successful. Indian rights advocates have been unsuccessful in their efforts to secure in the United States
law the principle that the United States should be held fully accountable
as a fiduciary under the same strict standards which apply to other fiduciaries who hold or manage the property of others in legal trusteeships
which exist outside the field of Indian law. The United States Supreme
Court ruled in a 1980 decision that the only legally enforceable duties
which the United States government has towards Indians are those
which are expressly set forth in specific laws enacted by the United States
government. Mitchell v. United States, infra at 184.
This decision echoed a statement prepared in 1979 by the Attorney
General of the United States in which the position was taken that the
United States has no fiduciary obligations to pursue Indian claims in behalf of Indian tribes unless those obligations are found "in specific statutes, treaties, and Executive Orders." "Statement of Attorney General
Griffin B. Bell to Secretary of the Interior Cecil B. Andrus, May 31,
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1979," infra at 183. In sum, under United States law today, the United
States government has no legal trusteeship duties toward Indians except
those duties which it specifically imposes on itself. Stripped of its legal
trappings, the Indian trust relationship is simply an assertion of unrestrained, political power over Indians and their lands, power which is
exercised without Indian consent and without substantial legal restraint.
An early 20th Century critic of the closely-related European imperial
"trusteeship for civilization" theory summed up the nature of such a
trust relationship when he labelled it "an impudent act of self-assertion."
Hobson, infra at 183.
CONTEMPORARY INDIAN LAND ISSUES

Perhaps American settlers of every age have felt it was their particular misfortune to be troubled by the problems of Indian land rights.
Most if not all of the earliest colonial settlements were soon deeply involved in sometimes violent conflicts with Indians over land. George
Washington and his administration devoted a major part of their energy
to negotiations, treaties, and military actions with regard to Indian land,
for land was the principal resource by which the new nation hoped to pay
for the costly revolution. It was also the source of conflict which
presented the single greatest threat to the national security.
The most recent one hundred year period has been not unlike that
which preceded it. Although the progressively greater military superiority of the United States has brought a virtual end to military fighting over
Indian land rights, there has been no real lessening of the numbers and
extent of the conflicts over land rights. Increasingly, those conflicts have
been fought politically and legally in the courts.
Physical conflict over Indian land rights, however, still occurs, particularly in instances of Indian occupations of their claimed lands. The
Mohawk occupation in the Mohawk Valley of New York in 1957, the
occupation by Pitt River Indian peoples in California in the 1970's, the
Mohawk repossession of Ganienkeh in the Adirondacks in 1974, and the
encampment of Sioux people in the Black Hills in 1981, are a few of the
more recent examples. But this is not a phenomenon only of recent
years. For well over 100 years the Seminole people in Florida have occupied and "squatted" on land which they claim and which they successfully fought to keep, but which non-Indians now claim to own.
Claims for land such as the Sioux claim to the Black Hills in South
Dakota have continued unabated for more than one hundred years and
still show no signs of ending. That claim commenced almost as soon as
the United States had confiscated the area. For years, the several Sioux
bands met in councils to make plans for recovering the hills, hampered
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by extreme poverty, great distances and lack of understanding of the
English language and the processes of United States law. At last they
were able to retain an attorney who in 1923 filed the first formal claim.
But that claim was for money and not for land as most of the Sioux had
wanted and expected. That case made its way slowly and unsuccessfully
through the United States Court of Claims, where a special act of Congress had been required to give the Court jurisdiction to consider the
case. Act of Aug. 13, 1946, infra at 183; See Cohen at 160. Then, in
1946, the Indian Claims Commission was established, and eventually the
Black Hills case was filed before it. That case continued until 1980, when
it was finally disposed of by the Supreme Court, as mentioned earlier.
Yet because the claim was for money only, and because the Oglala
Sioux, the largest of the Sioux bands, and other Sioux have refused to
accept the money award in place of their right to the land, the case has
remained alive. Consequently, new law suits have been filed, and more
are planned. Lobbying efforts to persuade Congress to return a portion
of the hills are being discussed, and the treatment of Sioux rights to the
Black Hills as been repeatedly brought to the attention of the United
Nations Commission on Human Rights.
In 1909, a parcel of land which belonged to the Oneida Nation, a
part of the Six Nations Iroquois Confederacy in upstate New York, was
lost through foreclosure on a mortgage illegally entered into by an
Oneida individual. But the treaties that had been made by the United
States with the Six Nations as well as the Federal Trade and Intercourse
Act of 1790 made any conveyance of Indian land, including a conveyance which is a result of a foreclosure action, illegal and void unless it
was done by treaty and with the approval of the United States. The
United States brought suit and recovered the land for the Oneidas, a result which sent a wave of concern through land owners and politicians
throughout the State in 1919. United States v. Boylan, infra at 184.
The case established that Indian land lost in violation of the Trade
and Intercourse Act could be recovered by a law suit in the federal
courts. A special Commission was established by the New York legislature to study the problem, but the report of that Commission was suppressed after its results supporting Indian rights to recover their lands
were presented in 1922. Upton, infra at 183.
Other Indians attempted to recover lands by bringing law suits, but
a peculiar and inscrutable legal doctrine barred the cases from being
heard. Deere v. St. Lawrence River Power Co., infra at 183. It was not
until 1974 that the Supreme Court decided that such claims could be
brought and decided in the federal courts. Oneida, infra at 184.
Thus, the resurgence of the claims of Indian peoples in New York,
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Connecticut, Maine and elsewhere, resulted largely from the opening of
the courthouse doors to claims that had been actively pursued for generations, but which had been barred from the courts for technical reasons.
It was not, as so many have supposed, a matter of Indian people cynically taking advantage of recently discovered technicalities to make
windfall claims for land given up long ago. On the contrary, little has
been so constant as the Indian efforts to recover lands which were wrongfully taken from them.
In 1985, the Onieda came to the Supreme Court after the lower
courts had found that the Oneidas had never lost title to the land lost in
violation of the Federal Trade and Intercourse Act and awarded the
Oneidas damages for trespass on their lands. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court decisions, holding that the Oneidas have a right to
sue for their lands and that they are not barred by the long passage of
time. For the first time, the Supreme Court affirmed that Indians still
have good title where their lands were lost in violation of the Federal
Trade and Intercourse Act. Oneida Indian Nation of New York v.
County of Oneida, infra at 184. This decision is likely to result in still
more claims being filed.
Figuring prominently in Indian land controversies in recent years
has been the Indian Claims Commission, an administrative body set up
by Congress to finally settle all the old Indian claims. But the Commission, which went out of existence in 1978 after more than thirty years of
proceedings, failed to conclude many of its cases, all of which were filed
by 1951 or earlier, and in fact generated a new round of claims and controversy. The Commission interpreted its mandate as permitting money
awards only. No other relief could be given, the Commission decided,
and the lawyers for the Indians never appealed or questioned that decision. After all, the act setting up the Commission provided that the lawyers could keep as a fee as much as ten percent of any money recovered,
in addition to compensation for their expenses. Lawyers had a powerful
incentive to file for money awards, which frequently ran into the millions
of dollars. So powerful was this incentive that lawyers filed claims to
recover money damages for land that their clients still owned and occupied. An example is the claim of the Florida Seminoles. See Indian Law
Resource Center, "Report to Congress: Seminole Land Rights in Florida" infra at 183. Usually, the Indian clients did not know that their
attorneys were making such claims. In some cases, the Indians learned
what was being done and sought to protest and stop the claim because
the payment of a money award for the supposed taking of Indian land
might extinguish the Indians' right to that land. 25 U.S.C. § 70(u). The
Commission and the Court of Claims, which heard appeals from the

1985]

INDIAN LAND RIGHTS

Commission, steadfastly refused to permit a claim to be amended or
withdrawn to avoid this extinguishment with one notable exception, the
case of Blue Lake of the Taos Pueblo.
In other cases, such as that of the Western Shoshones in Nevada and
California, the Commission and the Court of Claims refused to permit
the claimant group to amend the claim to avoid the loss of large areas of
land to which they still had title. See "Memorandum in Opposition to
Attorney's Fees and Expenses," Western Shoshone v. United States, infra
at 184.
The attorneys involved constantly cajoled the Western
Shoshones to believe that the claim would have no effect on their land
rights. Yet some of the Shoshones were still living on the land in question, and all authorities agreed that nothing had ever been done to transfer or extinguish the Indian right to the land that had been confirmed by
a treaty with the federal government. A federal court later held that the
Western Shoshones did indeed still have good legal title to the land in
question, at least up until the time of payment of the money award.
United States v. Dann, infra at 184.
In 1985, the Supreme Court ruled that "payment" of the claim had
taken place when the funds were placed in a trust account in the U.S.
Treasury, even though the Shoshones refused to accept the award.
United-States v. Dann, infra at 184. The Court's decision inplies that the
Shoshones are barred from claiming aboriginal title when the federal
government seeks to eqit them from the land or to prosecute them for
trespass. Efforts are still underway to gain recognition of the Western
Shoshone rights to their original lands in Nevada.
The Western Shoshone case has been by no means unique. On the
contrary, there have been a considerable number of such fraudulent or
questionable claims, including the Black Hills claims, other Sioux claims
before the Court of Claims, the Pitt River claims, several claims involving lands in New York, and many more cases in which the affected Indian tribes or groups are refusing to accept the money awards.
For years, Indian people sensed and feared that the prosecution of
such claims for money would result in the loss of not only claims for
return of land but also present title and right to possession of lands.
Many Indian people regarded the process as constituting a "sale" of their
lands, an exchange of their lands for money. To many, if not most Indian peoples, the sale of Indian lands is a great moral and legal wrong
because the land is regarded as sacred, a gift of the Creator which is
essential to the survival of future generations.
Indian land was and is widely regarded by Indians as "non-merchantable"-something not capable of being bought and sold. McNickle,
infra at 183. To many Indian people the buying and selling of land is as
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repugnant as others might find the buying and selling of the air we
breathe. The revulsion that is felt to the concept of dividing and selling
air, that same moral wrong that is sensed in commercializing something
that is taken for granted and freely available to all, is what has been felt
by Indian people with regard to the buying and selling of their land.
The religious character of the land and the fundamentally different
concept of land tenure of many Indian people has played a determining
part in many of the still unresolved conflicts over Indian lands. These
facts account for the phenomenal tenacity of Indian peoples in their land
claims. This lies at the root of the conflicts between the Indian and nonIndian worlds over land. Western civilization has tended to regard land
as a uniquely important resource of great economic and political value
which may be bought and sold and, of course, owned outright by individuals or groups. On the other hand, land is regarded by Indians as a
sacred gift of the Creator which is to be held in common for the welfare
of the present and future generations. The concept of exclusive ownership is sometimes entirely absent, and even today some Indian peoples
regard it as fundamentally wrong to "own" land-much as every civilization now regards it as wrong to own a human being. To be sure, Indian nations, tribes or bands, controlled defined territories which they
regarded as their national territories and within which they claimed exclusive power of government, but this in general, is to be distinguished
from proprietorship of the soil. In some instances the land was regarded
as being in the hands of the women or clan mothers, but then only as
stewards for the present and future generations. See, Snyderman, infra
at 183, and Cooper, infra at 182. Thus, in many Indian cultures, no person was regarded as having any ability or authority to sell or convey
land-that was and is for many Indian people a conceptual impossibility.
The clash of these views about land became of immense functional
importance in the treaty councils where American settlers sought to
make deals with Indian leaders to acquire lands. To be sure, some Indian
leaders found no difficulty in parting with land in transactions, which in
today's English language appear to be sales to the settlers. See e.g., the
deed executed at Ft. Stanwix, November 5, 1768, in E.B. O'Callaghan,
infra at 183. But in many other cases, cases which are still at the root of
conflicts over land, the settlers asked the Indian parties for what they
simply could not give: title to the land. In the first treaty made by the
United States with an Indian nation after the revolution, the United
States sought to clear title to the territory in the Ohio valley which was
needed to pay debts incurred during the war. The Six Nations Confederacy would by no means cede or grant title to the land to the United
States, but ultimately agreed to "yield to the United States, all claims to
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the country. . ." (Treaty of Ft. Stanwix, 1784), in exchange for United
States recognition of the Confederacy's right to lands in what is now
New York State. Problems remained with regard to rights to certain
portions of the territory dealt with by the 1784 treaty, and those questions were the subject of another treaty in 1794. Again, the Six Nations
denied any power to give up or bargain away any land, and again compromise language was found whereby the Six Nations, in exchange for
renewed promises by the United States agreed that they would "never
claim any other lands within the boundaries of the United States;.
[Treaty of Canandaigua, 1794].
The spiritual attachment to land is apparent in most if not all contemporary Indian claims and controversies over land. For example, the
traditional leaders of the Hopi villages in Arizona have carried on an
eloquent campaign to stop the "sale" of their lands through the claims
process for more than thirty years. A statement of one Hopi leader, Andrew Hermaquaftewa, will illustrate the nature of the Hopi resistance to
the Indian Claims Commission proceedings. That case remains
unresolved.
This land is our home, given to us by the Great Spirit. It is not for
sale and we are not going to sell it.
It seems that many of our young people are falling for the new
plans that come to us from Washington, plans which say that we
should take our mineral resources out of the Mother earth and
thereby accumulate money with which to buy more land. This to
me is a very foolish thing to do because this is already our land.
We cannot buy it again with the very thing that comes out of it.
To buy and sell land is not right in the sight of our Great Spirit.
The Taos Pueblo in Northern New Mexico was somewhat more successful in its effort to regain a portion of its lands of particular religious
significance. They began with a claim filed with the Indian Claims Commission, but carefully avoided making a claim for money in exchange for
the loss of the land. Instead, they prosecuted the case to the point of
proving their title to the land in question, which was Blue Lake. At that
point they abruptly stopped the case before the Commission and demanded that the United States return Blue Lake. After much political
pressure was put on the Congress and the administration, Blue Lake was
returned to the Pueblo by statute in 1970.
Religious attachments have also been central to the long struggle of
the Sioux to recover the Black Hills, and the latest law suit of the Oglala
Sioux Tribe described the Black Hills as a sacred place of worship. The
Western Shoshones have organized the Western Shoshone Sacred Lands
Association, expressing in its name the central concern of the group.
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But religious attachment to the land accounts only in part for the
longevity of Indian land claims. Just as significant is the fact that these
claims are not simply assertions of private rights by individuals or
groups. Rather, they are claims of entire nations, communities, and cultures. Usually they are claims of real functioning governments, and often
the land in question has been guaranteed by a formal treaty. Because
Indian land rights and land tenure are distinctly national or "tribal"
rights held in common, the claims often have a nationalistic character
that makes abandonment of land rights or land claims tantamount to
renunciation of all Indian rights and status.
Every year brings new settlements or purported settlements of Indian land claims. Often the settlement or the proferred settlement is a
payment of money, but in other cases, steps are taken to restore land to
the affected Indian "tribes" or communities. Cases such as the Narragansett claim in Rhode Island and the Passamaquoddy and Penobscot
claims in Maine have reached settlement through negotiations and legislation by Congress and the states. Most of the claims, however, go on in
the courts, and in public dialogue with little immediate hope of
resolution.
It may well be doubted whether these claims can be settled in a
lasting manner, and indeed whether the existing settlements will prove to
be stable, in light of the legal conditions which have been described. Can
an agreed upon settlement be fairly reached, we may ask, where one of
the parties has the absolute legal power to dictate the result? Even as the
more recent claim efforts have proceeded, bills have been drafted and
introduced in Congress to simply do away with claims for return of land
altogether, something that could never be done with regard to any legal
claims other than those of Indians. Without basic changes in the legal
conditions under which claims are handled, it is doubtful that the present
claims can be fairly resolved.
Indeed, in recent years, Indian governments have increasingly begun
to resort to bodies such as the United Nation Commission on Human
Rights, complaining that United States treatment of Indian land rights
constitutes a serious violation of human rights as established by international law. Present in almost all of the covenants and declarations establishing internationally recognized human rights during the period since
World War II have been the right to own property and the right to equality under the law. With great justification, several Indian nations and
tribes, including the Six Nations Confederacy, the Oglala Sioux Tribe
and others have filed formal complaints against the United States, calling
attention to the fact that United States law expressly denies them due
process of law and basic equality of rights. Indian Law Resource Center,
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Report on the Presentation of Human Rights Complaints by Indian Nations infra at 183.
At every session of the Commission on Human Rights since 1978,
Indian representatives have addressed the Commission calling attention
to the denial of their rights. The force of such activity is limited, of
course, to the force of world opinion, but that may be of considerable
importance where basic human rights are concerned. The importance of
these issues at the international level is reflected perhaps by the fact that
the United States is repeatedly constrained to answer and explain its actions, and by the fact that the U.N. Commission on Human Rights at its
1982 session, and later the Economic and Social Council, voted to establish an on-going Working Group on Indigenous Populations specifically
mandated to deal with problems of violations of the rights of Indian
peoples.
CONCLUSION

The conflicts and concerns about Indian land rights that have been
part of United States history from the beginning have changed relatively
little in that time, largely if not entirely because this nation has not dealt
with those conflicts in a just and lawful manner and has not established
any just process for legally resolving those conflicts. The irony of this
nation's refusal to subject itself to a genuine legal process for the resolution of these land disputes has meant that the disputes, claims and conflicts over Indian land rights never come to an end.
Even today, it is frequently said in law that the United States government has "plenary power" over Indian lands and Indian affairs, a
term which has come to mean virtually absolute, legally unfettered
power. In regard to land, there has been little advance in federal Indian
law since 1903, the heyday of Teddy Roosevelt's jingoism, when the
Supreme Court ruled in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, infra at 183, that Congress had the legally unrestrained power to abrogate Indian treaties,
"paramount power over the property of the Indians by reason of its exercise of guardianship over their interests, and that such authority might be
implied, even though opposed to the strict letter of a treaty with the
Indians."
The failure to resolve Indian land conflicts has its origin in the law,
and particularly in the decisions of the Marshall Court which reached
beyond the settled rules of law to fabricate a special and new "rule"
which made Indian land rights into mere rights of occupancy, subject to
extinguishment by the federal government. This capitulation of the federal courts to political expediency became, and still is, the typical judicial
response to violations of Indian land rights by the United States. This
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application of the political question doctrine has been the legal mechanism most frequently relied upon to deny legal protection to Indian land
rights. Likewise the federal trust responsibility, with its claim of judicially unrestricted federal political powers over Indian lands and resources, has denied Indians legal resources and has shielded the federal
government from legal accountability for its actions.
Each of these disabling legal doctrines is rooted in the imperial theory and racial discrimination of the 19th Century. At the core of this
law is the belief that Indian peoples, their property and affairs may be
properly made subject to the control of a superior, white civilization.
Marshall himself unabashedly cited the colonial law and practices of
Spain, Portugal, France, Holland and England as legal precedents. McIntosh, at 574. The underlying belief of Indian racial inferiority is sometimes express and sometimes implicit, but always present in the "legal"
notions of a dependent people being involuntarily made subject to the
tutelage, pupilage, guardianship or trusteeship of another race.
To reform this body of law will be essential if we are not to find
these same Indian land issues still creating conflict a hundred years from
now. The now vast body of constitutional law, particularly in the fields
of civil rights and rights to due process of law, provide ample authority
and guidance for bringing about the needed change. Universally recognized principles of human rights suggest that Indian peoples must have
at least the same legal protection for their property as other races of people enjoy. To establish so simple a proposition in United States law will
be no easy task, but the far-reaching reforms that have been brought
about in the fields of civil rights, the rights of the accused and other basic
human rights over the past generation, suggest that there is much reason
for optimism.
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